Russian Paradoxes

They needed Kosovo's independence to be recognized by the world, but they still spoke out against it. THIS is the true contradiction

There’s been a lot of talk juxtaposing the recent Russian invasion of Georgia and its quasi-annexation of the irredentist regions of Abchazia and South Ossetia, with the secession of Kosovo from Serbia. In fact, not only commentators and “Western” politicians have been prone to see a linkage between these two events, but also and especially the Russian “evil twins” Medvedev and Putin have spelt out the connection explicitly. Echoing the choir of “told-you-so” that could now be heard from all those who had opposed the independence of Kosovo, Medvedev aimed the cold blue blast of his gaze at the CNN reporter and said “Well, the West claimed that Kosovo was a special case, and now we tell you that Abchazia and South Ossetia are also special cases.” You could almost hear the nya-nya-nya-nya-nya. Subsequently, further commentators and politicians retorted by expatiating how Kosovo and the rogue regions of Georgia and not alike, and how the comparison is cynical and unfounded.

However, what I find most interesting about the debate in general and about Russia’s stance in particular, is what certain observers perceive as the contraditory character of Russian policy, or at least of the Russian rhetoric. How could they oppose Kosovo’s independence and acknowledge Abchazia and South Ossetia? How could they sanctify territorial integrity and sovereignty in one case, and completely violate it in another case? How can they grant Abchazia and South Ossetia what they’ve persistently and violently denied Chechnia? Searching the entire planet for examples and counter-examples in which International Law (whatever that means) would “justify” or legitimize the claims for independence of certain regions – Taiwan, Hong Kong, the Balkans, Palestine/Israel, Cyprus – everybody is real busy trying to enforce the illusion of universal and categorical rules on a world that insists to work through instances of actors breaking the rules rather than adhering to them.

The way in which various people perceive this alleged paradox of Russian foreign policy is quite telling. It is indicative not only of what goes on inside Russia, but also of the current perspectives through which the rest of the world sees Russia. I think you could basically group these perspectives into several typical tendencies –

Russian Schizophrenia














This perspective is most characteristic of your average conservative and slightly gullible political theorist/commentator. These people analyze reality through the prism of rational, utility maximizing unitary actors. Therefore, when Russia refuses to acknowledge Kosovo’s claims to independence due to the infringment of Serbian territorial intergrity and the breach of the principles of internationl law; and then turns around and invades a sovereign Georgia and proceeds to acknowledge the independence of Abchazia and South Ossetia – you have these people jumping up’n’down like a bunch of trained chimps, going “Oooh-oooh-oooh, foul ball! Foul ball!” This kind of understanding doesn’t even scratch the surface of things. All this bunch can do is state the obvious by saying that Russia’s previously proclaimed stance clashes with its current actions, and infer from this seeming contradiction the moral inferiority of the Russian position, seeing that their actions are in conflict with what they’ve claimed in the past. Russia’s behavior doesn’t make sense; it implies a “double standard”; therefore, it isn’t moral nor “fair”; therefore, they’re in the wrong and they are the bad guys.

Problem is, this perspective overlooks many aspects of the issue.

First of all, “double standards” have been a standard element of foreign policy at least for the past 25 centuries. I won’t fall down the slippery slope of comparing Russia with other global superpowers, like, say… the US for instance, and the latter’s inclination to act in ways that suggest a double standard. Rather, I’ll just cite one classic example – the violent takeover of the (heck, let’s add some pathos) “peace-loving people” of Melos by the professed democracs and good guys of the Athenian/Delian League, who wanted to “protect” the island from potential Spartan aggression. So if you take Thucydides’ word for it, democracy, sovereignty and non-violence at home (one standard), were perfectly compatible with tyranny and unilateral military intervention abroad (another standard). So please guys, spare us the gasps of astonishment and the self-righteous jabber.

Second, and this is where things start to get interesting, these people don’t even stop for a moment to think how to reconcile the Russian stance in these two contradictory cases.
Did the Russians really mean it when they swore by international law and territorial integrity in the case of Kosovo? If they did, how could they have turned round so fast and trampled those very principles? If they didn’t really mean it, if it was just hot air and empty statements (sure didn’t look like it), then why did they say it at all?

Let’s assume for a moment, that the Russians (or at least their bloated leaders) are the proud, self-important characters that they make themselves out to be. That would mean that they don’t just say things – they take themselves seriously, and they’d like others to take them seriously too. If we accept that, it would entail that from the Russian point of view, the most desirable reaction of the rest of the world would have been to say “oh, ok, if the Russians say that recognizing Kosovo's independence is a bad idea, well, we don’t want to upset them… let’s forget the whole thing.” If the world had done that, then Russia would have been in the pits when it came to Georgia, now wouldn’t they? As they would have had no recourse to the Kosovo argument, how could they have justified their recent moves in Georgia? And let’s not forget, widespread opinion has it that whatever the Russians are up to, they definitely did mean business when it came to their move on Georgia; and, what’s more, everybody seems to think that they’ve had this planned for quite some time now – even before Kosovo.

So if the Russians planned their invasion of Georgia a long time ago (at least as long ago as FEB 2008, when Kosovo declared its independence); and if they didn’t mean no bullshit when they were saying NO to Kosovo’s independence; and if they would like the world to take them seriously – then why did they risk preventing Kosovo from happening, by standing out so resolutely against it? They needed Kosovo to happen, so that they could use the “right to self-determination” nonsense that Medvedev is now reciting like a lil-goody-two-shoes schoolboy who’s read the UN Charter, in order to justify the Russian acknowledgement of Abchazia and South Ossetia as independent, sovereign regions. They needed Kosovo's independence to be recognized by the world, but they still spoke out against it. THIS is the true contradiction, not the usual double standard shyte.
But more about that next time. Nighty-nite…